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The Long Arm of the Law 
Ann Okerson, Moderator, Senior Advisor, Center for Research Libraries 
Section Written by William Hannay, Partner, Schiff Hardin LLP 
Section Presented by Bruce Strauch, Professor, The Citadel 
Georgia Harper, Scholarly Communications Advisor, University of Texas at Austin 
Madelyn Wessel, Associate General Counsel, University of Virginia 
The following is a transcription of a live presentation at the 
2013 Charleston Conference. Slides and video are available 
online at http://bit.ly/1hnPSqo. 
Ann Okerson: Welcome back to the fourth session 
of “The Long Arm of the Law.” Those of you who 
have been here for previous sessions know that 
our guest star has been Kenny Rogers; however, 
he has been very busy with the Country Western 
Awards in Nashville and could not join us today. 
But, he has sent a substitute, namely, Bobby 
Fuller. Now, this is no mean feat, because as some 
of you know, Bobby Fuller died in mysterious 
circumstances in 1966, I believe, and so to have 
him with us with this group is really an amazing 
kind of Charleston achievement that only Katina 
could pull off. So they are going to sing “I Fought 
the Law” to get us in the spirit of this session. This 
is “I Fought the Law” in Latin. 
I actually had a moment when I thought maybe 
we could get Katina to get some of the Charleston 
librarians dancing on the stage to this, but, well, I 
was not sure how well that would go over. 
Anyway, our speakers in succession are as follows, 
and they are going to do their thing in order 
needing no introduction beyond what you already 
have in your program. First of all, Bill Hannay. 
Whoops. Well, Bill decided not to come to 
Charleston this year. He decided that instead he 
would go to a hospital in Chicago and spend the 
time there getting operated on. He sent this 
image, and he sends you his greetings. But, 
standing in for Bill, we have Bruce Strauch of 
Charleston fame. He is a professor at the Citadel, 
he is an attorney, and sometimes he even looks a 
little bit like Bill Hannay, so I think he is a very 
good stand in. 
We then will move to Georgia Harper, who is the 
Scholarly Communication Advisor at the 
University Libraries of the University of Texas. 
Georgia and I met many years ago; she was an 
attorney for Systemwide Copyright, for the Texas 
system, and has done some marvelous work that 
many of you know about.  
Our final speaker is Madelyn Wessel, who is 
Associate General Counsel at the University of 
Virginia. I have heard that she has done wonderful 
things to help the librarians with their various 
concerns in digital projects. 
So, that is our lineup for today, and without 
further ado, let me introduce Bruce. 
Bruce Strauch: I am married to Katina, and inter 
alia, to the Charleston Conference. I have a 
perfect attendance certificate to prove it. Some 
years ago, she found this incredible attorney in 
Chicago named Bill Hannay, who was a Yalie, and 
a Supreme Court clerk, which just mystifies me, 
that level of brain power. He commutes to work 
by train, which I think is an indus of a big deal 
attorney, to stand on a train platform with an 
overcoat and a briefcase. He is an antitrust lawyer 
and a tremendously talented guy. Then he tells us 
he has to have a heart bypass, and I was 
indignant. I said, “Bill this is not all about you. 
What about us?” He was strangely unmoved by 
the whole thing. He has come through it; it really 
is a fairly finely tuned operation now. He is at the 
dreadful phase where your ribs have been broken 
open and now stuck back together, and you have 
to blow into this tube with this little ball that goes 
up to get bad stuff out of your lungs. Do it 50 
times, you know, and start thinking fondly of a 
death panel. I have his paper here, and it is not my 
subject; I am not an antitrust lawyer, so I am going 
to do this dreadful thing of reading it. Well, my 
students think the most dreadful thing I could do 
is to expect them to know something and ask 
them questions, but this is sheer boredom. I will 
try to make it through. 
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Legal E-Books and Illegal E-Books, Written By 
William Hannay1 
The general topic for my contribution to the “Long 
Arm of the Law” program this year is the 
continuation of two ongoing epic sagas in the 
world of digital books: the Apple e-books price-
fixing conspiracy and the Google Books copyright 
litigation. Charleston Conference attendees will 
perhaps remember my earlier accounts of 
episodes in these sagas: “Of Books and 
Competition” in 2010; “Apples and Books or A 
Gaggle of Googles” in 2011; and “iPad Thai” in 
2012. Since the last Charleston Conference, much 
has happened in the Apple and Google cases. Let 
us start with the trial and judgment in United 
States v. Apple. 
United States v. Apple, Inc. 
As you may recall, in April 2012, the United States 
Department of Justice filed a civil suit against 
Apple and five of the six largest U.S. publishers 
alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
arising from an alleged conspiracy to fix the price 
of e-books. On the same day, the DOJ announced 
an already-negotiated settlement of the case 
against Hachette, HarperCollins, and Simon and 
Schuster. Not long thereafter, the attorneys 
general of 33 states filed their own cases against 
the defendants which were joined with the DOJ’s 
suit for pretrial proceedings. 
How did this happen? It all started with the 
explosive success of Amazon’s Kindle e-reader. As 
more and more publishers started offering e-
books in 2009, Amazon sought to dominate the 
business with a low-price marketing strategy: 
Amazon would retail all e-book bestsellers at 
$9.99 for use on its Kindle e-reader (even if the 
print version sold for a lot more). Publishers were 
                                                            
1 William Hannay is a partner in the Chicago-based 
law firm, Schiff Hardin LLP, and an Adjunct Professor 
at IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law. He is a frequent 
speaker at the Charleston Conference and the 
author of nine books on antitrust and trade 
regulation. This paper has been previously 
published: Hannay, W. (2014, April). Against the 
Grain, 26(2), 56. 
not happy about this pricing point, and neither 
was Apple which had plans to include an e-reader 
program on its iPad (scheduled to be introduced 
in 2010) but needed prices to be higher than 
$9.99 in order to make a profit.  
The publishers and Apple began meeting in 
December 2009, and by January 2010, Apple had 
executed individual “agency agreements” with 
each of the publishers under which Apple would 
act as an “agent” in selling e-books at a retail price 
set by the publishers (which were $3 to $5 higher 
than Amazon’s $9.99 retail price). In order to 
make this pricing point work economically, 
Amazon had to be pushed to raise its own prices. 
The motivator for this change was a price parity 
provision in the agency agreements called a Most-
Favored-Nation clause (MFN). The provision not 
only protected Apple by guaranteeing it could 
match the lowest retail price listed on any 
competitor’s e-bookstore, but also imposed a 
severe financial penalty upon the publishers if 
they did not force Amazon and other retailers to 
change their business models and cede control 
over e-book pricing to the publishers. 
When the government sued, the publishers 
settled out, but Apple chose to go to trial. After a 
3-week trial in June of this year, U.S. District Judge 
Denise Cote—hearing the case as the fact finder 
when the parties waived a jury—ruled that Apple 
had, in fact, conspired to restrain trade in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
relevant state statutes. United States v. Apple, 
Inc., Case 1:12-cv-02826-DLC, Dkt No. 326 
(S.D.N.Y.), Opinion, filed July 10, 2013. Note that, 
since this was a civil case, rather than a criminal 
case, the correct terminology is that Apple was 
“found liable,” not “convicted.” 
The court found that the publishers and Apple had 
“agreed to work together to eliminate retail price 
competition in the e-book market and raise the 
price of e-books above $9.99.” Opinion at 11. 
According to the court, Apple was the lynchpin in 
the conspiracy between and among Apple and the 
publishers: “It provided the Publisher Defendants 
with the vision, the format, the timetable, and the 
coordination that they needed to raise e-book 
prices.” Id. 
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Judge Court found that the MFN clause 
“eliminated any risk that Apple would ever have 
to compete on price when selling e-books, while 
as a practical matter forcing the Publishers to 
adopt the agency model across the board.” 
Opinion at 48. The MFN clause “literally stiffened 
the spines of the Publisher Defendants to ensure 
that they would demand new terms from 
Amazon.” Id. at 56. And during their negotiations 
with Amazon, the publishers shared their progress 
with one another. (The court’s written opinion 
includes a chart of telephone calls between the 
CEOs of the publishing houses.) 
The court concluded that the conspiracy 
significantly harmed consumers. Since “the laws 
of supply and demand were not suspended for e-
books,” when the publishers increased the prices 
of their e-books, they sold fewer books. Opinion 
at 97. Thus, consumers suffered in a variety of 
ways from this scheme to eliminate retail price 
competition and to raise e-book prices: some 
consumers had to pay more for e-books; others 
bought a cheaper e-book rather than the one they 
preferred to purchase; and still others deferred a 
purchase altogether rather than pay the higher 
price. Id. at 98. 
Analyzing the trial record, Judge Cote found that 
there was “compelling evidence” that Apple 
“conspire[d] with the Publisher Defendants to 
eliminate retail price competition and to raise e-
book prices” and “overwhelming evidence that 
the Publisher Defendants joined with each other 
in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy.” Opinion at 
113. Apple was “a knowing and active member of 
that conspiracy…not only willingly join[ing] the 
conspiracy, but also forcefully facilitat[ing] it.” Id. 
In short, “[t]he totality of the evidence leads 
inextricably to the finding that Apple chose to join 
forces with the Publisher Defendants to raise e-
book prices and equipped them with the means to 
do so.” Opinion. at 134–35. Judge Cote even 
quoted Apple founder Steve Jobs’s own words 
against his company, pointing out that, on the day 
of the launch of the iPad, Jobs told a reporter that 
“Amazon’s $9.99 price for [a book newly offered 
on iPad for $14.99] would be irrelevant because 
soon all prices will ‘be the same.’” Id. at 149.2 
The court subsequently had proceedings to 
determine what remedy to impose on Apple. On 
September 5, 2013, Judge Cote entered a Final 
Judgment and injunction against Apple. The 
court’s order requires Apple to modify its existing 
agreements with the five major publishers with 
which it conspired—Hachette Book Group (USA); 
HarperCollins Publishers LLC; Holtzbrinck 
Publishers LLC, which does business as Macmillan; 
Penguin Group (USA), Inc.; and Simon and 
Schuster, Inc.—to allow retail price competition 
and to eliminate the most favored nation pricing 
clauses that led to higher e-book prices. Apple is 
also prohibited from serving as a conduit of 
information among the publishers or from 
retaliating against publishers for refusing to sell e-
books on agency terms. Apple is further 
prohibited from entering into agreements with e-
books publishers that are likely to increase the 
prices at which Apple’s competitor retailers may 
sell that content. 
Importantly, Judge Cote also granted the 
government’s request to appoint an external 
“monitor” to ensure that Apple’s internal antitrust 
compliance policies will be sufficient to catch 
future anticompetitive activities before they result 
in harm to consumers. The monitor—whose salary 
and expenses will be paid by Apple—will work 
with an internal “antitrust compliance officer” 
who will be hired by and report exclusively to the 
outside directors comprising Apple’s audit 
committee. (The Department of Justice had 
initially requested that the monitor have broad 
powers to block any agreements the company 
might make to sell any digital content—not just e-
books, but also music, movies, and television 
shows—that might, in the monitor’s view, be 
likely to increase consumer prices; however, 
                                                            
2 For a fascinating collection of excerpts from Steve 
Jobs’s e-mail introduced as evidence in the case, see 
Zachary Seward, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2013/05/the-steve-jobs-emails-
that-show-how-to-win-a-hard-nosed-negotiation/ 
276136/. 
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Judge Cote granted power only over e-books to 
the monitor.) 
Two weeks ago, Judge Cote appointed Michael 
Bromwich as the external monitor of Apple. The 
60-year old Bromwich is an experienced criminal 
prosecutor and investigator, sort of a “go to” guy 
for difficult, high profile assignments. He helped 
investigate the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, 
probed the FBI’s conduct in the Aldrich Ames spy 
case, and took over the regulation of offshore 
drilling after the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
Earlier in his career, he was on the prosecution of 
Col. Oliver North. To counterbalance Bromwich’s 
lack of experience in antitrust matters, he will be 
assisted by Bernard Nigro, the chair of the 
antitrust department at the NY law firm, Fried 
Frank. 
Apple, Inc. continues to maintain its innocence 
and has recently filed an appeal of Judge Cote’s 
orders to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in New York City. The appeal will probably 
take a year or more to work its way through the 
system, but it is not likely that the district court’s 
order will be overturned. The liability finding is 
based on well-recognized principles of horizontal 
conspiracy theory and reasonably grounded in the 
evidence, and the remedy order seems carefully 
and narrowly drawn to address Apple’s specific 
type of misconduct, without overreaching into 
other areas of Apple’s business (as the 
government had wanted). 
A more interesting question is whether the 
enforcement action against Apple and the 
publishers will meaningfully benefit either 
consumers or libraries. For consumers, the prices 
of bestsellers in e-book format appear to have 
stabilized at levels lower than those prevailing 
during the time of the conspiracy, but are about 
15–20% higher than Amazon’s $9.99 price point in 
2009. For example, John Grisham’s Sycamore Row 
sells for $11.99, regardless of whether you order it 
as a Nook Book, Kindle edition, or from the Apple 
iBookstore.3 And there are potential damage 
                                                            
3 Changes in the marketplace itself may bring 
procompetitive effects as well. For example, just a 
week ago, Accenture announced that it has built and 
will operate an end-to-end e-commerce and direct 
claims to be paid by Apple and the publishers: the 
five publishers have already settled the states’ 
claims against them for $166 Million in damages. 
Their settlement with the DOJ involved only 
injunctive relief. Judge Cote has scheduled a trial 
of Apple for May 2014 to determine the damages 
that it will have to pay the states and private 
plaintiffs as a result of its e-book price-fixing. The 
amount of overcharges—which would be trebled 
under the antitrust laws—could total hundreds of 
millions of dollars in damages. 
For libraries, the question of whether the Apple 
case has been or will be of any benefit is more 
complex. As some of the programs offered at this 
year’s Charleston Conference illustrate, publishers 
have made life difficult for libraries that wish to 
make e-books available to patrons or researchers. 
Some publishers refuse to publish a lendable e-
book version of their titles, and those that do 
offer a lendable one impose high license fees (you 
cannot “buy” the book) and also various 
restrictions on circulation. If you buy Sycamore 
Row for your personal Nook or Kindle, it will cost 
you $11.99, but if you want a lendable version for 
the public library, you will probably pay eight 
times that amount (assuming that Doubleday will 
lease you one). 
Why do publishers seem so determined to make it 
hard for libraries to lend e-books? I bet it has 
something to do with money, eh? Publishers 
probably think they will “sell” more e-books to 
individuals if folks cannot click on their local 
library’s web site and download a copy of the 
book for free. Is it legal for publishers to impose 
high prices and burdensome lending rules on 
libraries? Probably, unless it turns out that 
publishers have been talking to each other about 
their e-book marketing strategies for libraries in 
the same way that they appear to have had 
consultations about working with Apple on prices 
to individuals. Personally, I do not know whether 
                                                                                         
to consumer distribution solution for HarperCollins 
Publishers e-books globally. The project commenced 
with the launch of HarperCollins’ www.CSLewis.com 
and www.Narnia.com. See http://newsroom. 
accenture.com/news/accenture-to-create-global-e-
book-fulfillment-platform-for-harpercollins.htm. 
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any such conversations between publishers ever 
took place regarding libraries, but it would 
present a potential antitrust violation if they did. 
Otherwise it becomes a matter of either 
Congressional action (not likely) or jawboning 
between publishers and their library customers 
(more likely).4 
Google Books 
Turning to the long-running battle between 
authors and Google over the Google Books 
Project, the marathon has entered its eighth year 
of combat. As Charleston Conference attendees 
will recall from my prior reports, in 2005, a 
number of authors and publishers brought a class 
action and related litigation in Federal court in 
New York City, charging Google with copyright 
infringement arising from Google’s agreements 
with several major research libraries to digitally 
copy books and other writings in their collections. 
(Since 2004, Google has reportedly scanned some 
20 million books.) It has delivered digital copies to 
the participating libraries, created an electronic 
database of books, and made text available for 
online searching. The Google Books Project and its 
“digital library” has been hailed as a boon to 
schools, scholars, and students, making all books 
—especially out-of-print works—available to the 
world. 
The authors and publishers had a rather different 
view of Google Books and sought both damages 
and injunctive relief from the court. Google’s 
principal defense was “fair use” under §107 of the 
Copyright Act. The district court, however, has not 
yet ruled on the fair use issue; instead, the case 
has been sidetracked in two separate 
(unsuccessful) settlement efforts and various 
procedural disputes. 
                                                            
4 For example, in response to member concerns, the 
Digital Content & Libraries Working Group of the 
American Library Association has focused on 
influencing the so-called “Big 6” trade publishers to 
sell e-books to libraries on reasonable terms. See E-
book Business Models for Public Libraries (August 
2012), http://www.americanlibrariesmagazine.org/ 
blog/ala-releases-%E2%80%9Ce-book-business-
models-public-libraries%E2%80%9D. 
Google and the parties suing it (particularly the 
Authors Guild) tried to settle the case in 2008 and 
again in 2010. However, after numerous 
objections, extensive briefing, and lengthy oral 
arguments, the District Court held that the 
amended settlement agreement was not “fair, 
adequate, and reasonable” and rejected it. See 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(S.D.N.Y., filed March 14, 2011). 
In an effort to put the case back on track, 
attorneys for the Authors Guild filed a motion for 
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) on 
December 12, 2011. After briefing and hearings, 
Judge Chin granted the motion on May 31, 2012. 
See 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Google 
appealed. On May 8, 2013, the U.S Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit heard oral 
argument and on July 1, 2013, issued an unusually 
brief opinion reversing Judge Chin’s grant of class 
certification on the ground that certification was 
“premature” and should await further 
proceedings on Google’s fair use defense. See 
Google, Inc. v. Authors Guild, Inc., 721 F.3d 132 
(2d Cir 2013). The Court of Appeals stated: 
Putting aside the merits of Google’s claim 
that plaintiffs are not representative of 
the certified class—an argument which, in 
our view, may carry some force—we 
believe that the resolution of Google’s 
fair use defense in the first instance will 
necessarily inform and perhaps moot our 
analysis of many class certification issues, 
including those regarding the 
commonality of plaintiffs’ injuries, the 
typicality of their claims, and the 
predominance of common questions of 
law or fact. Moreover, we are persuaded 
that holding the issue of class certification 
in abeyance until Google’s fair use 
defense has been resolved will not 
prejudice the interests of either party 
during the projected proceedings before 
the District Court following remand. 721 
F.3d at 134. 
Thus, the question of whether it is “fair use” to 
electronically copy millions of copyrighted works 
has now resumed center stage in the Google 
Books case.  
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Judge Chin wasted little time in moving forward 
with consideration of the fair use defense. After 
the parties submitted legal briefs, the court heard 
oral argument on September 23, 2013. While it is 
notoriously unreliable to divine which way the 
case will come out from the give and take of oral 
argument, at least one court watcher concluded 
that the judge was definitely leaning towards 
Google.5 Judge Chin appeared to find the decision 
by his fellow judge Harold Baer in the HathiTrust 
case to be controlling. 
In that case, Judge Baer of the U.S. District Court 
in New York City was faced with the obverse side 
of the Google Books case. It involves the same 
copying of millions of books by Google, but the 
case looked at that conduct from the viewpoint of 
the libraries that received from Google and, in 
turn, made available the digitized books to their 
patrons. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the libraries in October 2012. 
See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 
2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court read Second 
Circuit law to hold that, where the use of the 
copied work is for scholarship and research, the 
analysis “tilt[s] in the defendants’ favor.” 
Moreover, the court viewed the copying as fair 
use because it was “transformative.” Judge Baer 
held that: 
The use to which the works in the 
[HathiTrust Digital Library] are put is 
transformative because the copies serve 
an entirely different purpose than the 
original works: the purpose is superior 
search capabilities rather than actual 
access to copyrighted material. The 
search capabilities of the HDL have 
already given rise to new methods of 
academic inquiry such as text mining. [Id. 
at 460] 
Judge Baer, therefore, dismissed the Authors 
Guild’s complaint against the libraries. 
                                                            
5 See Albanese, A. (2013, September 24). Publishers 
Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.publishers 
weekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/copyright/article/ 
59222-after-quick-hearing-google-books-case-
appears-ready-to-be-decided.html 
During oral argument in the Google case, Judge 
Chin drew attention to Judge Baer’s conclusion 
that the library copies in the HathiTrust case were 
fair use and asked counsel for the Authors Guild 
whether the court was not in fact bound by that 
ruling. Judge Chin pointed to ways in which 
Google Books has improved research and enabled 
new kinds of research, such as data mining. (He 
noted that his law clerks use Google Books to do 
cite checks.) He asked whether these uses are not 
“transformative.” Counsel for the Authors Guild 
countered by focusing the court’s attention on 
Google’s motivations, which were commercial, 
not exploratory. He also pointed out that the 
Authors Guild has appealed the HathiTrust 
decision to the Second Circuit. 
It is hard to predict whether the appellate court 
will agree with Judge Baer’s admittedly 
unprecedented application of the concept of 
“transformation” in HathiTrust to permit copying 
of the complete text of millions of books. Judge 
Chin seemed to take a harder line when he 
rejected the proposed Google Books settlement in 
2011. At that time, he flatly declared: “Google 
engaged in wholesale, blatant copying, without 
first obtaining copyright permissions.” 770 F. 
Supp. at 679. Now he seems to have changed his 
tune. 
It is hard to accept the proposition of Judge Baer 
(and perhaps of Judge Chin) that the ease of 
electronic searching of scanned documents is 
legally “transformative.” Research for centuries 
has been done by human beings reviewing the 
text of books and documents, looking for words or 
names or ideas. The fact that a computer can 
perform that search process faster does not, it 
seems to me, transform the process into 
something so different as to allow an 
unauthorized party to ignore the copyrights of the 
original authors and publishers. Copying millions 
of books and storing them in a searchable 
database may indeed be a useful thing for the 
world, but defending that copying on the ground 
that it is for the public good strikes me as little 
more than a “Robin Hood” defense, in which 
stealing from “rich” authors is justified on the 
ground that the proceed are being given to “poor” 
academics. Is that really a “fair” use? 
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Georgia Harper: Well, I am going to talk about 
transformative use. I am not going to talk about 
Google, though, because that case has not really 
been decided yet. But we have had a bunch of 
really super cases this year that do go into why we 
think things are transformative or how we can be 
sure they are, and in academe that really matters 
to us. This trend with transformative use started 
in 1994 with a case that was a parody that Bill 
might have enjoyed standing up here and singing 
about. It was the “Oh Pretty Woman” case. I do 
not know if you are familiar with it, but it was a 
song by Roy Orbison that was parodied by a rap 
group and turned into a song about an old hairy 
woman, a prostitute walking down the street. 
They did quite a number on old Roy’s song. The 
Supreme Court did a number on the people who 
sued, however, by saying that what the rap group 
did was transformative. They did not elaborate 
different types of transformative fair use, but the 
court decisions since 1994 are a lot easier to 
understand if we recognize that there are 
different types.  
Pam Samuelson described an approach that I 
found really useful in an article from 2009 called 
“Unbundling Fair Use.” It is important to 
understand, first of all, that these transformative 
uses are most likely to be fair use when they 
support free speech first amendment values. 
Second, one might create transformative works 
and one might also have transformative purposes 
in using another’s work. And third, the three 
categories that Samuelson identifies within works 
and purposes can overlap.  
Transformative works are the easiest to recognize: 
the parodies, the satires, the appropriation art. 
These photos (referring to slide) show how Jeff 
Koons adapted an advertisement for selling shoes 
into a collage that he calls Niagara. The court 
found that use to be transformative. When, as 
here, the work is used as raw materials in 
furtherance of distinct creative or communicative 
objectives, the use is transformative. 
Transformative purposes include productive uses 
and/or orthogonal uses. HathiTrust, to whom 
Bruce referred, is a good example. But first, let me 
give you some ones that are more familiar 
perhaps. These would be uses that promote 
ongoing authorship. Research uses, including 
making copies that will be used to inform or 
critique or commentary, copies for new reporting, 
quotes to illustrate a point, to demonstrate, to 
explain. Another example might be making a 
photograph of a sculpture for an analytical piece. 
HathiTrust comes into the picture here with 
transformative uses where its digital copies of 
books are used to enable access by the blind and 
visually impaired. Again, one might wonder, as 
Bruce did, what is so transformative about making 
books available for the blind? But that is what we 
have these days, is a court decision that says it is. 
It is up on appeal, we do not know how for sure it 
will come out, and it is something to watch. It is 
certainly something that a lot of people are 
cheering. 
Orthogonal uses are those wholly unrelated to the 
use made or envisaged by the original author. 
These are uses for a new audience, for a new 
purpose, and HathiTrust is, again, instructive on 
this point, the point that Bruce raised. Digitizing 
works to index them for full text search and to 
enable text mining are the examples we have 
today. Now, again, these are strongest when they 
support first amendment values.  
Let me give you another example to illustrate the 
differences among these categories. One might 
critique or comment upon Margaret Mitchell’s 
book Gone with the Wind by making a new 
creative transformative work, another novel, like 
The Wind Done Gone, or by writing a scholarly 
article. Both might be fair uses, but one would rely 
more on a transformative work creating a new 
work; the other on a transformative purpose, a 
productive use. One might also use her work for 
an orthogonal purpose by including it in a text 
mining project, perhaps to discover new 
information about authors of her era or her genre, 
which information itself might become the subject 
of another study. My use of these images is also 
orthogonal. I use them to provide a visual 
reference for what many would say are rather 
subtle nuances that define different aspects of 
transformative fair use. As an instructor, I like to 
rely on fair use of visual images to promote 
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understanding of the law among those who want 
to keep their activities within its sometimes 
evanescent boundaries. 
Now, keep in mind that even if a use or a purpose 
is transformative, the user still must comply with 
the rest of the requirements for fair use. She must 
use only so much of the other’s work as she needs 
to achieve her transformative work or purpose, 
and the benefit of the use to the public must 
exceed the harm to the copyright owner’s normal 
expectation of commercial exploitation of his 
work. With this framework in mind, let us look at 
what happened in 2013. I chose three cases from 
what was a rich array of results this year with very 
interesting challenges. First, Ed Sullivan 
challenged the Jersey Boys, Faulkner challenged 
Midnight in Paris, and street artist Derrick Seltzer 
challenged Green Day. 
First, we will do Ed Sullivan. Sofa Entertainment is 
the owner of the copyrights to the Ed Sullivan 
Show. They sued Dodger Productions, the 
producers of a play about the ‘60s rock band the 
Four Seasons. Dodger used a 7 second clip of Ed 
Sullivan introducing the band. In the view of the 
Ninth Circuit, the use was for historical 
significance. The court noted that the defendants 
had imbued the clip with new meaning and had 
done so without usurping whatever demand there 
was for the original clip. The lower court awarded 
Dodger attorney fees of $155,000 because it 
viewed Sofa’s infringement claim as objectively 
unreasonable and determined that awarding the 
fees would deter future lawsuits that might chill 
the creative endeavors of others. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed that award at the same time that it 
affirmed the fair use defense. Now this 
exemplifies a productive purpose. The Jersey Boys 
uses a 7 second clip to show, to illustrate, to 
demonstrate a point in the Boys’s historical 
trajectory. Making it on the Ed Sullivan Show was 
a major accomplishment. In fact, at the time, the 
Four Seasons viewed it as their best hope for 
reviving their popularity in the midst of the British 
invasion. The clip also illustrates an orthogonal 
use. The new audience, the different expressing 
purpose, the recontextualizing: all of these give 
the older content new meaning. The use of this 
image serves as a visual reference for me to aid 
you in understanding and retaining the 
information that this case embodies, the 
information I am trying to convey. These actors 
and their director and producers are taking a risk, 
and they are making a statement about their right 
to reference the culture of the twentieth century, 
our culture, for purposes other than the original 
expressive purpose of the creator of the materials 
and for a different audience, and that is what I am 
trying to do as well. 
Now, Faulkner. Has anyone seen this movie? In 
Midnight in Paris, Owen Wilson’s character Gil 
Pender at one point says, “The past is not dead. 
Actually, it is not even past,” which he attributes 
to Faulkner, even though it is slightly off, and he 
goes on to recount a conversation he has just had 
with the long-dead Faulker as proof of his 
assertion. Now, this movie is a comedy. It is filled 
with literary and artistic allusion. This particular 
quote describes Pender’s problem. It is “Golden 
Age” thinking, the erroneous notion that a 
different time period is better than the one one is 
living in. You know, it is a flaw in the romantic 
imagination of those people who find it difficult to 
cope with the present. This Golden Age thinking 
pervades the film, both in its plot and its theme. 
Faulker’s point was altogether different; it was 
about the past catching up with you. This suggests 
that the use was orthogonal. It is a productive use, 
as well; in other words, Midnight’s director had a 
transformative purpose. The quote is used to 
illustrate a point about our attachment to the life 
of the past. To explain, and this is, as you all know, 
a rather traditional use of a quote, a short quote. 
The Court elaborates on the orthogonal purpose, 
however, but going on to say that the speaker, 
time, place, and purpose of the quote in these 
two works are diametrically dissimilar. The quote 
even takes on an aspect of transformative use, in 
the creative sense, in the Court’s view, and this is 
where they quote back to the “Oh Pretty Woman” 
case, Campbell. The use of these nine words in 
Midnight undoubtedly adds something new with a 
further purpose or different character altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message. 
So the quote has been entirely recontextualized, 
and that itself is what is transformative. 
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Now the third case relies on a creative use, not 
the purpose we have been talking about so far: 
Selter v. Green Day. Photographer Richard Staub 
had earlier taken a photograph of a wall that was 
just plastered with Derrick Seltzer’s street art. And 
when he was later hired by Green Day to create a 
video for the group that would play during a live 
performance, he built a set that included an image 
that was inspired by Seltzer’s work. The video 
actually filmed a series of artists coming onto the 
set, adding art to the wall, and then exiting. The 
film was the creation of the wall. Finally, the video 
played as the backdrop for a single song in a 
Green Day performance, and these three 
photographs illustrate the process of that 
transformation. Interestingly in this case, the 
plaintiff actually helped the defendant make his 
case. Seltzer complained about how much Green 
Day had changed his work. How horribly they had 
deformed it, and how they had changed its 
meaning to be almost the opposite of what he had 
intended. Well, of course, these qualities are 
precisely what made it transformative and a fair 
use, even though Green Day used the whole of his 
image. Further, it was clear that Seltzer would 
never have given permission for this, so Green 
Day had no option but to rely on fair use. And 
importantly, the use supports a free speech value, 
and finally, the harm to Seltzer was, by his own 
admission, minimal, and that he never would have 
licensed the work, so the value to the public far 
outweighed the harm to Seltzer. 
Now, what does this mean for us in academe? 
Well, of course, being from academe myself I see 
very positive implications for scholars, but also for 
their publishers, for artists, and their distributors, 
for actors, poets, their directors, and their 
producers, and, of course, for instructors. These 
cases are very good news for all of us who are 
involved in the creation, dissemination, and 
discussion of works. They give us all room to 
move, and this is what fair use is supposed to do. 
As the court in the Jersey Boys case said, it was 
quoting an earlier phrased decision, “An 
overzealous monopolist can use his copyright to 
stamp out the very creativity that the act seeks to 
ignite. To avoid that perverse result, Congress 
codified the doctrine of fair use.” So fair use 
requires of us, as copyright owners, that we not 
hold so tightly to our views about what we can or 
should control. Copyright is porous on purpose. 
The law gives us all these freedoms, and our 
society is a lot better off when creators are not 
afraid to take full advantage of them. 
Madelyn Wessel: Good morning. I am here as a 
practicing attorney at a fairly large research 
university. Ann had emphasized the importance of 
this session being at least a little provocative and 
tackling issues of current relevance, so I thought I 
would take us away from cases in the last portion 
of the talk this morning and actually talk about 
some hands-on issues with respect to online 
ed[ucation], MOOCs, and some threads that I see 
emerging in that space in my own work for my 
institution and in talking with colleagues at others: 
issues that really are not about copyright, but I 
think are very important to librarians: issues like 
privacy and issues around data use and data 
rights.  
I will spend about 5–10 minutes talking about 
some of the intrinsic copyright issues and 
concerns and IP ownership issues with respect to 
Massively Open Online Courses, and then you will 
see that we are going to move into some related 
issues. When we are talking about MOOCs or 
online materials, there are a number of big 
overwhelming topics. One is, of course, course 
production and copyright issues; some of you may 
have attended Ann Okerson’s "hot issues" 
preconference where Kevin Smith spoke about 
copyright issues and MOOCs, which I am sure was 
really wonderful. There are intellectual property 
and ownership rights, as between faculty and 
institutions, and this is a topic that is heating up 
quite a bit right now. The AAUP, the faculty 
organization, is putting out a call to arms around 
academic freedom rights and ownership of faculty 
course materials, which they see threatened by 
the advent of university-sponsored agreements 
for Massively Open Online courses. We have got 
FERPA and ADA compliance, which I do want to 
talk about today; we have got EULAs and privacy 
policies inherent in participation in open online 
courses; and we have got some issues that I will 
close with today: just because a course is “free” 
does not mean it’s actually free. What is 
happening around data mining and data usage in 
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this new space? And finally, the issues of 
compelled transfer of IP, and when I say 
compelled transfer, I mean compelled transfer for 
our faculty and students when they engage with 
cloud services around learning and teaching. 
It goes without saying that course materials are 
heterogeneous, and as someone who has staffed 
my institution’s project with Coursera, this really 
was brought home to me. My thought was, “Well, 
we are going to have to get a release from that 
talking head up front who is getting filmed for that 
course.” When you start to really think about 
what is involved in a course presentation, 
especially one that is going to succeed online, you 
are talking about a lot of other materials—all the 
fun little gimmicks. By the way, this talk today has 
been denuded of all the fun slides that I take off 
the web like everyone else does to make people 
wake up and to say hello, because unlike Georgia, 
I am not making images the subject of this talk. 
Like many, many faculty, when I give a talk in a 
classroom or face-to-face that is not being 
recorded, I use images to have fun. And faculty 
are used to doing those kind of things in their 
teaching; they are not used to thinking about 
rights concerns at all in that process. But those 
kinds of issues can become very live and vivid. 
And then, of course, there are issues around 
delivery of materials to students or participants in 
these open courses. All of these are different 
threads in the copyright equation. All of them 
explode the safety of the traditional classroom 
and face-to-face teaching, in which, as librarians 
and others involved in the teaching and learning 
enterprise know, we have a lot of liberty—that 
liberty that comes from the copyright statute and 
from the realities of fair use in the classroom. But 
when you are interacting with a MOOC platform 
provider, they are going to treat you as an 
institution if you are an institutional participant. 
The institution has to take the role of warranting 
rights vis a vis a publisher.  
We are now producing courses in an online 
environment where all of the conventional 
permissions and rights issues that publishers apply 
to our faculty when they publish books, or a film 
studio’s going to apply when its releasing a movie, 
really come into play in some kind of way. Georgia 
and I were talking last night about how faculty 
who create these courses are not thinking about 
these issues. The enterprise of trying to work with 
faculty for institutional delivery of a MOOC course 
that may be, at least to some reasonable extent, 
not totally illegal, has been really been challenging 
for us. 
Here are the traditional copyright exceptions 
(referring to slide) that we love, that we use all 
the time in institutions of higher education. They 
are built to support a progressive and 
opportunity-rich teaching and learning enterprise. 
The issue is that, most of them, at least within the 
structure of the Statute, are not written in terms 
of Massively Open Online Courses that will be 
generally available on the web. They are written in 
terms of specific hierarchies and structure within 
higher education itself. What we are finding is 
that, in this space, fair use is again very important. 
Fair use has a place within the copyright advisory 
space for MOOCs, but what are the rules? And 
these are questions that have not quite been 
answered yet. 
For example, what are the rules when it comes to 
delivering these recorded course materials to 
thousands of individuals worldwide? Does it 
matter if the platform provider is explicitly for 
profit? We all know that we have seen the 
Supreme Court reject an analysis going back at 
least as far as Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the 
2Live Crew/Roy Orbison case that Georgia 
mentioned; we know the fact that there may be a 
profitable interest, motive, or result that does not 
disallow fair use. That is an old argument that was 
hurled at artists and others under the fair use test, 
and the Supreme Court said that it can be a factor, 
but if your use is truly transformative—even if you 
are making money, you may still have a perfectly 
valid fair use case. But how does that concept 
apply in this particular environment, that is, if our 
institutions (as we are all reading practically every 
day in the Chronicle of Higher Education or the 
New York Times), are really looking towards ways 
to obtain revenue from these programs in the 
long term. So how does that affect the fair use 
analysis? Does our not-for-profit status help to 
outweigh the for-profit status of a for-profit 
platform provider? Does it matter if the content is 
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being beamed worldwide to countries that do not 
have any fair use concept in their copyright 
regime? These are lots and lots of issues, and as 
one of my children said coming home from school 
one day, “Mom, I am perplexed by the 157 
questions for which God has no answers.” These 
are on that list too. 
Here are some pivots that I feel fairly strongly 
about, and I think a lot of my colleagues within 
the academy are advising on. Third-party content 
that is integrated into, whether online courses, 
videos, or content that is uploaded for broad 
public access, is obviously going to work better if 
it is transformative. Georgia has just described a 
number of very recent cases where courts are 
agreeing with that. It is always important to 
remember the good, wonderful Ninth Circuit 
cases around the use of technology being our 
friend. Wherever it is possible to use content in a 
way that is not rivalrous with perfectly legitimate 
needs of content owners, that is a good way to go. 
If you can use thumbnails or low resolution 
images, that is great. Links that are going to 
support a publisher’s opportunity when you are 
using tiny bits of content can also be a helpful way 
to at least make content owners our friends and 
can potentially help with a fair use analysis. I 
would say, though, that it is not viable to say I am 
going to upload a whole lot of book chapters so 
100,000 students worldwide can read chapters of 
books. I think that is a licensing issue, and people 
have got to tackle that one. 
IP ownership, just for a minute or two: this is an 
issue that I have found perplexing in its public 
parlance or discussion recently because the reality 
is that this all boils down to the Copyright Act and 
institutional policy. For those of you in the room 
who are at educational institutions, which I 
suspect are quite a few people: institutional 
policies around faculty ownership of intellectual 
property almost invariably distinguish between 
types of faculty output. Most institutions at this 
point stipulate that faculty own their own 
scholarly articles and books. So faculty can 
produce scholarly articles and books that are the 
products of their research, they can do it at least 
in part on university time, they can sit in their 
office laboring over that. We want them to do so; 
it is part of the criteria of tenure and promotion, 
and we give the authorial rights to faculty; we 
either restore them based on how our policy 
operates, or we never take them away in the first 
place. We explicitly carve that out. This is then 
where institutions diverge a little bit. Some 
institutions, my own included, do assert an 
ownership right at the institutional level to course 
materials, even regular old course materials. That 
does not mean that we would say to Professor X 
who moves to another university, “You cannot 
take your syllabus and your lecture notes with 
you,” but we would at least assert a right to hold 
onto that content at our own institution. In fact, 
from a technical perspective, my policy says we 
own those goods. 
Other institutional IP policies tend to afford a 
broader swath of rights. Some institutions say 
faculty own all typical faculty outputs, whether 
course materials, books, or articles. But all 
institutions put up stop-gaps when it comes to the 
creation of intellectual property artifacts that 
employ significant university resources. Where 
you are getting a ton of support and investment 
from the university, the university asserts an 
ownership right. This comes in part out of patent 
law areas, where faculty and institutions need to 
have strong and clear rights to be able to 
disseminate IP in a patent licensing process and 
get royalties back, both for the inventors and for 
the institution. Distance and online education 
courses almost invariably involve a ton of 
investment. I have heard that the average Massive 
Open Online Course right now is costing 
institutions $100,000–200,000 per course to 
produce; when you are talking about video 
recording, addressing all the rights issues, support 
from grad students and others, that is a very 
significant institutional investment. Institutions, 
under their universal policies around this, really 
do own the IP rights, or at least have a claim to 
them, and these may be shared with the faculty. 
The concept that university participation in these 
projects is robbing faculty of rights is one that I 
remain puzzled by. You will be hearing more 
about that; some of where that is coming from is 
a perfectly understandable concern about 
displacement. The issue around academic 
prerogatives to choose and create courses, the 
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concern about displacement of teaching 
opportunities, those are realities. We are in a very 
disruptive space right now in higher education. 
Those concerns are clearly being brought to bear 
around this issue. Regardless of how all this 
settles out, platform providers need clarity in their 
rights because when an institution signs up and 
delivers a course to a MOOC platform, the 
platform provider wants to know that the rights 
are clear and okay.  
Accessibility is a huge and growing issue, one 
where the Department of Justice and the Office of 
Civil Rights are really slamming us, probably for 
some good reasons around accessibility of new 
technologies and new content opportunities. We 
all need to expect that any form of licensing, 
whether we are securing content from a publisher 
for journal access through libraries or whether we 
are delivering content online, is going to be 
subject to ever more rigorous accessibility 
expectations under the ADA and under Section 
504. Institutions that receive federal funds, that is, 
all of us, absolutely have to think about these 
issues. We are being used, quite frankly, by 
advocacy groups to be the tail that wags the 
content-producing and technology dogs. Under 
the ADA, the Department of Justice cannot tell, let 
us say, Google or Elsevier, “Thy content must be 
accessible,” but they can tell institution X, Y, and Z 
that if we license content that is not accessible, 
we are out of compliance. There is an explicit 
strategy to ensure that higher ed is fully aware of 
our obligations and so that we push technology 
providers and content creators to render the 
content accessible and compliant. That is another 
horizon issue I want to flag. It is coming up in the 
context of MOOCs, but it goes far beyond MOOCs. 
Now, let us downshift to a different gear. I am 
going to move away from ADA to talk for a few 
minutes about privacy and data use issues, and 
then we can start a conversation. What is it that is 
really happening, first, in the MOOC space? Well, 
it has been pretty important to the for-profit 
company Coursera in their terms of use (one of 
those many, long, unread, 17-page documents 
that we all click through and do not read 
thoroughly), to say that “Hey, you are not our 
student.” We talk about students taking online 
courses, but Coursera, for example, says you are 
not our student and we are not subject to the 
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, FERPA, 
which drives an awful lot of compliance efforts at 
institutions of higher education. You are not our 
student, and, because of that, institutions that are 
working with an entity like Coursera (and there 
are a lot of other companies out there) are also 
wanting to be very careful because we do not 
want to be in a position where it looks like we are 
enabling a formal student relationship with the 
institution that would give rise to rights and 
responsibilities, not only under FERPA, but around 
accreditation and all kinds of other compliance 
environments, which would put the institution in 
a very bad place with respect to its delivery of 
content. 
The paradigm is, we are giving you content, we 
are not enrolling students at the institution. Here 
is where things can get very interesting. Anyone 
here currently at an institution where you have 
created courses and uploaded them and where 
your faculty are “flipping” the courses? Me too. 
One of the things that I realized late in the game 
was that we had faculty who had created great 
courses, and they really wanted to flip the 
classroom and experiment with that model, which 
is an interesting thing, one of the important 
drivers of this experiment with MOOCs. But they 
were having students just enroll with Provider X in 
order to take the course at the institution. That 
brings FERPA right back into the picture. If the 
students, in enrolling for that course, have got to 
waive their FERPA rights and agree to have their 
data commercially used, then actually I have 
forced a student at my institution to waive their 
privacy rights in order to take a course at my 
institution. It is not just some participant, some 
nonstudent out there in the universe who is 
agreeing to that trade in exchange for free access 
to education, it is my institution; it is something to 
think about. You want to make sure that that is 
not happening and that students have a legitimate 
choice around privacy waivers.  
The issues around privacy and compliance are, by 
the way, going to be ever broader because the 
European Union has an even more rigorous 
structure around privacy than the United States 
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does, and I think we can expect open online 
course providers to be grappling as we see 
Google, for example, constantly getting sued in 
European countries around privacy practices. This 
stuff is going to be part of the online space as 
well.  
This leads me to a final couple of slides, and not 
just about MOOC providers. The EULA, the online 
license, the end user license that is getting thrown 
in front of us every time our browsers touch the 
web, is a really important thing for us to care 
about. It is something important for librarians to 
care about, increasingly. I know how ubiquitous 
this is, and I know how hard it is. Every single 
person in this room who signed up for Internet 
access clicked right past a EULA. You do not know 
what that said. You probably agreed to indemnify 
some company, whoever the service is from, and 
you probably agreed to be sued in whatever home 
state jurisdiction they have. You might have 
agreed to share data in ways that would not be 
very appropriate from the perspective of your 
institutions policies. You just do not know because 
nobody reads them. I am here to say that when 
we are employing cloud products, products that 
involve a faculty or student’s browser touching a 
web space, we must care about those issues. We 
should care about them a lot because 
fundamental issues of privacy, of IP ownership, 
and of use and access to data are implicated 
there. When you start to read EULAs, you find 
some very tricky and unpleasant things. For 
example, think about cloud products that are 
being tested by faculty in the classroom to 
measure learning analytics, which is one of those 
hot new terms. If you read through the license, 
you may realize that your faculty and students 
have agreed that all of the IP that is created in 
that course testing space has also been given 
nonexclusively to the host and can be used and 
reused by that company. And when the license 
does not comply with FERPA in the first place, and 
your students in taking your class have to agree to 
these kinds of terms, that is an issue of concern, 
at least to me. I think it is the kind of issue that is 
also of concern to the libraries.  
New copyright strategies of platform providers, 
whether they are MOOCs or others, also bring us 
back into this cycle. Platform providers are trying 
to make deals with publishers and content owners 
who are perfectly reasonable in their intentions, 
but if you are an institution and you have 
launched a course and the course is being linked 
through content deals to publisher opportunities, 
you are not a party to that agreement. If the 
platform provider is giving away the farm around 
privacy and IP ownership rights, and your faculty 
are not reading this language, and your university 
is not interpreting it, and not realizing that by 
agreeing to utilize certain content or certain 
textbooks as part of a course, anyone who enrolls 
in the course is going to be dragged into a space—
again, that has privacy or IP ownership and data 
rights implications. That is not good stewardship. 
Cloud companies, in general, are seeing this space 
as opportunity rich. Frankly, they are counting on 
something that is true, which is that we cannot all 
read these licenses. For example, when it comes 
to institutional programs, I have two grown-up 
kids, and I know that they have very little of this 
sense of privacy that I might have as an older 
person. They have thrown their lives up on 
Facebook, and they Twitter, and they really do not 
care very much about these issues. And that is 
fine in the private and personal space of all of us. 
But when it comes to the stewardship we have as 
institutions and libraries towards our students and 
faculty, we need to up the ante in our game.  
Here is, for example, something that just struck 
me in the last two weeks, in the middle of a 
negotiation I am handling for many institutions in 
my state: it is a very big deal for a content license. 
All of sudden pops up a deal we have historically 
renegotiated every 5 years or so. In reviewing the 
renewal license, I realized that the hard won 
compromise that our state’s libraries had around 
usage statistics needed attention. The balance of 
patron privacy, library needs, and publisher 
legitimate needs had suddenly been tilted by a 
new little clause in the license that said, first of all, 
that all privacy was going to be safeguarded, 
except as described in the license itself, which was 
usage statistics based, or as described in the 
online privacy policy. And what does the online 
privacy policy say? Basically, the publisher can 
change its policy whenever as desired, which is 
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what we all know can happen with online policies. 
I strongly objected to this. This is not a situation 
where, frankly, we should have a EULA or an 
online license. We have faculty and students 
reading articles off this database. They are not 
uploading to the database; they are simply 
reading content that we are buying at enormous 
expense. I do not think their privacy rights ought 
to be breached when we are paying millions of 
dollars a year to deliver content to them. You 
need to watch out for these things, because if you 
do not, you are basically setting up a dynamic 
where the library-licensed resources have become 
another tool to harvest data in ways that you may 
not think are appropriate. 
I am happy that we already got an introduction to 
the wonderful Woody Allen, because I am ending 
with Woody Allen here. “Just because you’re 
paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get 
you.” Lest you think I have jumped off the deep 
end as a lawyer for my institution, know that 
many factors must be appropriately balanced. We 
are living in a dynamic world of new technology, 
data analytics are here to stay, and I am not 
someone who is objecting to content owners 
having opportunities to interact with institutions 
around data sharing and analysis. That is going to 
happen. The issue is whether it is happening in a 
place where the fulcrum of ethics and of 
stewardship is reasonable and where we are 
paying attention enough to these issues to not, 
frankly, get dragged right off the boat into the 
deep end of the sea without knowing what is 
happening. My admonition here is that we need 
to be alert to these matters; we need to not check 
our skepticism at the door. We do not want to be 
so excited about winning these wonderful 
copyright battles in federal courts, which has been 
an increasing trend, that we lose our critical 
judgment around other things that could be 
happening that could be undermining some of 
those victories at the very same moment. Thanks 
so much.
 
 
